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For us, the ownership of the territory is a marriage of the Chief and the 
land.  Each chief has an ancestor who encountered and acknowledged 
the life of the land. From such encounters come power. The land, the 
plants, the animals and the people all have spirit, they all must be shown 
respect.  That is the basis of our law. 
Chief Delgamuukw, also known as Ken Muldoe,                       
Opening Statement in the trial of Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia1   
 
I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the meaning of 
my destiny. 
I should constantly remind myself that the real leap consists in 
introducing invention into existence. 
In the world through which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself.  
I am a part of Being to the degree that I go beyond it. 
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 229 
 
 
Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing 
something. 
Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence, 23 
 
 
A ‘revolutionary message in a reactionary time’?2 John Borrows’ book Recovering 
Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law, offers us something else- an intricate 
set of movements that traverse the space between the limits of contemporary 
political, legal and social structures and their very foundations. Borrows critiques the 
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origins of the settler colonial state and its law, contemporary Aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence, and government policies that have left Aboriginal communities 
dispossessed and marginalized. He presents a passionate and nuanced critique of 
the failure of the recent political and legal recognition of Aboriginal rights to 
significantly change the lives of Aboriginal communities.3 In the best spirit of critique, 
Borrows also presents his audience with his vision of a new political and legal order 
in Canada, one which would not only heed the call for increased Aboriginal 
representation in political, legal, and social institutions, but one that would 
incorporate Aboriginal law and legal knowledges into existing legal structures. The 
author attempts to re-map the boundaries of citizenship to include other ways of 
being, other forms of governance, other ways of conceptualizing our relationships to 
land, resources, and each other.  
John Borrows’ book pushes the boundaries of several different and 
overlapping bodies of work. One is the existing work on Aboriginal rights in Canada; 
another is post-colonial literature that addresses issues of (cultural) identity, 
difference and rights; and third, the more specific literature on the concept of 
recognition. Borrows’ book doesn’t remain confined to one of these ‘fields’ of 
scholarly inquiry, but pushes the boundaries between them through innovative 
arguments and analyses.  
The body of work on Aboriginal rights in Canada is of course very diverse in 
perspective, analysis and prescription. Aboriginal rights and legal scholarship 
necessarily encapsulates a wide range of disciplinary and topical threads. Some 
people have taken on the task of recovering histories of Aboriginal communities, with 
a view to re-shaping the dominant historiography of colonial settlement and attendant 
myths about the state of Aboriginal societies, cultural practices, laws, languages and 
bodies of knowledge. Other scholars have addressed the legislative and judicial 
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dimensions of colonial settlement;4 the relationship between Aboriginal rights and the 
nation-state;5 and others, the extent of ongoing and developing Aboriginal legal rights 
in Canadian jurisprudence.6   
John Borrows’ book is unique in that it addresses the history of colonial 
settlement, recognizes the myriad injustices levelled at Aboriginal societies, and also 
seeks to utilize Aboriginal law as a means of showing how the contemporary legacies 
of colonial settlement could be ameliorated.7 He holds the Supreme Court of Canada 
accountable for maintaining the fiction of the colonial assertion of sovereignty, and 
outlines several proposals for how law and ‘the political’ could be re-conceptualized 
and radically re-shaped so that Canada could move beyond the strictures of its 
predicament of being a putatively post-colonial nation that still carries the hallmarks 
of injustice that are a direct or indirect result of colonialism.8  
In theorizing how the nation state can move towards post-coloniality, Borrows 
interrogates the relationship between non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal communities; 
and by doing so, raises the question of the identity of the nation. Recovering Canada 
traverses the growing body of post-colonial theory, with a focus on cultural difference, 
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identity and rights. Borrows builds on existing critiques of the way in which culture 
has been conceived of and commodified within a paradigm of multiculturalism9 by 
demonstrating how Aboriginal law can and ought to be used and incorporated within 
mainstream jurisprudence. As I explore in greater detail below, he illuminates how 
embracing Aboriginal difference can mean the creation of sui generis law, which 
would be the unique result of both Aboriginal and common law legal reasoning and 
precedent. 
Borrows skilfully presents the reader with an introduction to an alternative 
epistemological and ontological paradigm in which to think about relations between 
individuals, communities, and the environment. He also persuasively contests a 
dominant historiography that relegates indigenous legal knowledges and modes of 
governance to an irretrievable past. Borrows presents a compelling ‘un-covering’ and 
interpretation of histories that refute common sense assumptions that Aboriginal 
sovereignty, including self-governance, modes of land use, and legal orders, were 
not recognized during the time of settlement or were extinguished.10 He elucidates 
the ways in which there was the simultaneous recognition and non-recognition of 
Aboriginal governance and laws. For instance, Borrows discusses early cases such 
as Connolly v. Woolrich11 and contemporary cases such as Casimel v. I.C.B.C.,12 
which demonstrate that Aboriginal laws have been recognized by the Canadian legal 
system over a long period of time.13 He also interprets historical treaties and 
contracts (such as the Two Row Wampum) in order to demonstrate what the 
intentions of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal parties were at the time that treaties were 
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reached, and how the vision of co-existence that this particular treaty reflects has not 
materialized.14 As Borrows point out, there has also been a parallel line of cases that 
have denied such recognition of Indigenous laws. Both historically and in 
contemporary caselaw, Aboriginal law and interests have been deemed to be a 
burden on Crown law, which is paramount.15  It is this line of reasoning that has been 
predominant and reflects a failure of recognition of Aboriginal law and interests, 
which, has in turn, resulted in the legal, political, social and economic repression and 
marginalisation of Aboriginal communities.16  
In this review essay, I use Borrows’ book as a focal point for a discussion of 
the concepts of recognition, identity and difference- themes which are undoubtedly 
important to the subject matter of his book and which also make his book relevant to 
a wide audience. I situate Borrows’ work in current debates about the politics of 
recognition17, and the problems inherent in identity-based rights claims. Although 
these problems have been thoroughly dealt with in what is by now a rather large 
body of literature18, the problems with the identity/difference relation persist, as 
(some) marginalized communities continue to make claims for legal and political 
recognition as the means towards decolonization or liberation.  
Borrows does not explicitly situate his work within the theories of recognition 
that derive their foundation from Hegel’s theory of mutual recognition, as do Charles 
Taylor and Axel Honneth. However, it is my view that the substance of his arguments 
in Recovering Canada involve the question of legal recognition, the form which this 
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takes, and how the relations between subjects and communities of Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal subjects are formed through processes of recognition and 
reconciliation. Borrows’ vision of a sui generis law and reconciliation are 
fundamentally about inter-subjective relations and mutual recognition, key aspects of 
theories of recognition that derive from Hegel, particularly through the thought of 
Charles Taylor.19 In this review essay, I illuminate how Borrows’ conception of legal 
pluralism offers a significant challenge the limits of recognition as currently conceived 
in the Canadian context.  
The invocation of cultural difference, as the basis for the recognition of 
Aboriginal rights by the state calls into question the substance of the ‘identity’ and 
‘difference’ of Aboriginal subjects in relation to the dominant, non-Aboriginal majority. 
At stake in the recognition of the rights of the Aboriginal (legal) subject is the 
particular way in which this subject comes into being in relation to the non-Aboriginal 
population, and vice-versa. The phenomenon of recognition shapes the contours of 
both the marginalized subject who seeks recognition and those who “recognize”.  
The recognition of indigenous rights in Canada has failed, in many respects, 
to displace the colonial nature of legal and political relations. Recognition has been 
tied to a paradigm of identity and difference that is devoid of mutuality; the only legal 
recognition that has been realised is of the subject already proper to existing 
boundaries of colonial sovereignty. The Aboriginal subject claiming recognition has 
been circumscribed, in other words, by a restricted economy20 of recognition, in 
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which the Court acknowledges only those rights claims that fit within already existing 
political, economic and legal relations founded upon a colonial sovereignty. The 
struggle for recognition can be understood as a means by which the sovereign self, 
in shoring up his own identity, refuses to recognise any desires, qualities and 
characteristics that do not mirror his own image and thereby subjugates the other 
who seeks recognition.  I will explore this critique in detail below. 
In the context of identity-based rights claims, recognition is thus understood to 
operate as a means by which the state, in reinscribing the legitimacy of its colonial 
foundations, refuses to recognise any qualities, characteristics, activities or customs 
that do not fit within the bounds of a colonial legal framework. As long as the 
recognition of the Aboriginal subject of rights is situated within this restricted 
economy, the relations of power that facilitated the marginalization of the Aboriginal 
subject is reinscribed- paradoxically, in the very claim for inclusion.21 In the colonial 
settler context, this conundrum appears to be practically inescapable.22 
More specifically, the question that emerges from the critique of the restricted 
economy of recognition is whether the recognition of communities on the basis of their 
cultural, ethnic, or racial “distinctiveness” can avoid raising the spectres of essence 
and authenticity. By now a well worn argument, critics of an identity-based politics 
argue that asserting a right on the basis of a cultural, racial or ethnic identity 
presupposes the existence of a pure, reified essence that is constitutive of one’s 
being.23  Ultimately, I argue that cultural difference operates as the modality through 
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which the totalising movement of the dialectic of recognition captures the “difference” 
that has always already been proper to the self- or the subject- which itself inscribes 
this difference. I will discuss how Borrows’ conception of a sui generis legal order goes 
a great distance in breaking out of the pitfalls of cultural authenticity and the reification 
of the difference that has characterised the reception of Aboriginal rights claims by the 
courts. However, I also explore how this process of intersubjective recognition, which 
avoids the problems of reification and authenticity, could be realized butt the cost, 
paradoxically, of maintaining and preserving cultural difference. 
  While Borrows critiques the way in which Aboriginal rights have been 
conceived of and defined by the Courts both prior to 1982 and after the inauguration 
of section 35 of the Canadian Constitution24, he ultimately engages with notions of 
equality, democracy, legal (and cultural) pluralism, and the rule of law as the modes 
through which the transformation of existing circumstances can take place. Borrows 
uses the contemporary disavowal of racist and colonial dichotomies between civilized 
and non-civilized, backward and modern to argue that in order to create a political 
community that upholds the rule of law and democracy- in order to create what 
Canada in fact already purports to be- vastly different structures of political and legal 
organization are required.  I argue that the turn to these foundational legal concepts 
thwarts what is otherwise a radical pluralist vision. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
form. It becomes necessary to represent the cultural community as possessing an essential difference 
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PART I. RECOVERING CANADA: BORROWS’ UNDERSTANDING OF THE PAST, CRITIQUE OF 
THE PRESENT AND VISION OF THE FUTURE 
 
A sustained critique of Borrows’ book is difficult given its innovative structure and 
content. However, in an attempt to further the dialogue that this rich and bold offering 
invites, I will raise some questions about how recognition and difference are 
configured throughout the book. Before I get to that, however, I will highlight the most 
pertinent aspects of Borrow’s analyses and arguments.  
 
A. Aboriginality and Aboriginal difference 
Borrows provides stunning critiques of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence as 
developed by the Supreme Court of Canada. In particular, he analyses the stated 
objectives of section 35(1), the conceptualisation of aboriginal rights, and how the 
content of such rights have been defined by the Supreme Court of Canada. Borrows 
points out that Aboriginal rights doctrine is informed by the objective of reconciliation- 
the reconciliation of the fact that prior to European settlement, “Aboriginal peoples 
were living in communities on the land” with “the sovereignty of the Crown”.  The 
Court acknowledges that Aboriginal rights exist because of the “simple fact that when 
Europeans arrived, Aboriginal peoples were already living on the land, in 
communities as they had done for centuries”.25 Acknowledging this ‘simple fact’ of 
the pre-existence of Aboriginal communities on the land gives rise to a torrential flow 
of questions:  
 
If Aboriginal peoples have prior rights to land and participatory 
governance, how did the Crown and court gain their right to adjudicate 
here? [Chief Justice Lamer] has to stem the flow. He has to regain his 
footing. He plants a flag. ‘[A]boriginal rights recognized and affirmed by 
s.35(1) must be directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of 
[A]boriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.’ Chief Justice 
Lamer now has a purpose with which to capture both the Aboriginal and 
the right- ‘the reconciliation of pre-existing claims to the territory that now 
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constitutes Canada, with the assertion of British sovereignty over that 
territory.’26  
 
Having stated the objects of reconciliation, Lamer CJ (for the majority) goes on to 
define the meaning of “Aboriginal”. “Aboriginal” is defined by the Lamer CJ to denote 
that which was integral to the distinctive, pre-existing cultures of the Aboriginal 
communities prior to contact with European settlers. To establish an Aboriginal right, 
the claimant must prove that the practise, custom, or tradition was “integral to the 
distinctive culture” of the community prior to contact with Europeans.27 As Borrows 
puts it, “Aboriginal is retrospective.”28  
Borrows critiques the temporal dimension of the court’s definition of Aboriginal 
rights. By basing Aboriginal rights on the distinctive cultures of Aboriginal 
communities as they existed prior to contact, the Supreme Court of Canada 
repeatedly  “relegates Aboriginal peoples to the backwaters of social development, 
deprives them of protection for practices that grew through intercultural exchange, 
and minimizes the impact of Aboriginal rights on non-Aboriginal people.”29  
Borrows argues that the concept and definition of Aboriginal rights should be 
based on the historical and continued recognition of the “laws and customs of 
Indigenous peoples”.30  Practises that were formed as a result of contact with 
European settler communities, practices that developed in order to ensure the 
survival of Aboriginal communities should also receive constitutional protection.31  
Borrows advocates for a conception of Aboriginal rights that protect practices that are 
necessary for the “physical and cultural survival” of the community.32 The purpose of 
protecting Aboriginal rights should “not necessarily be to preserve distinctive 
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elements of pre-contact culture”, but to ensure the survival of those communities 
today.  
As Borrows points out, the Court, in Van der Peet, first found it necessary to 
define the term ‘Aboriginal’ for the purposes of adjudicating Aboriginal rights claims. 
Aboriginal difference from what is non-Aboriginal lies at the heart of Aboriginal rights 
doctrine. This basis of the right itself, entrenches the concept of ‘essence’ at the 
heart of Aboriginal rights doctrine- it presupposes as its constitutive criteria 
something distinctly – or essentially- Aboriginal about the right being asserted. While 
I wholeheartedly agree with Borrows’ critique of the way in which the majority of the 
Supreme Court of Canada has defined Aboriginal rights, I will pose some additional 
questions below about the basis of Aboriginal rights, and the pitfalls of defining the 
rights of Aboriginal peoples through the notion of Aboriginality in the Canadian 
context.   
 
B. Indigenous legal knowledges and radical legal pluralism; or, sui generis law 
In the face of the misrecognition of Aboriginal legal knowledge and the 
consequent injustices it has wrought, Borrows makes an argument for the recognition 
of Aboriginal law and legal knowledges on the basis of “tests aimed at reconciliation 
which suggest First Nations laws should receive substantial protection from 
conflicting non-Aboriginal laws in [certain] circumstances”.33 Reconciliation becomes 
the means through which a meaningful recognition of Aboriginal law ought to take 
place. Much of the book is a blueprint for the epistemological, ideological and 
correlative legal shifts that are necessary in order to effect such a reconciliation.34  
Borrows introduces his readers to Indigenous conceptions of law and illustrates 
how different legal orders can inform one another in such a way as to create a 
genuinely unique and plural legal order. The notion of a sui generis legal order that 
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would result from the ‘co-mingling’ of various Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legal 
orders would create something entirely unique, in which the maintenance of 
difference – a difference that distinguishes itself from what is the same in some 
essential way- would not, ultimately, be possible or even desirable. I argue that the 
notion of a sui generis legal and political order provides a movement towards a more 
radically anti-essentialist basis for political community than does a politics of 
difference. I also want to suggest that the politics of difference through which the 
recognition of difference currently takes place in the Canadian judicial context is not 
compatible with the notion of sui generis law for which Borrows argues. The politics 
of difference, and the difference which it preserves, relies on an idea or 
representation of a community’s essence or (essential) being.  
The first shift that Borrows identifies as required for reconciliation is in the 
realm of language. There is a need for courts to “find more appropriate terminology to 
describe Aboriginal rights” and “[u]ltimately this requires recognizing a category of 
Canadian law to receive First Nations law.”35 This terminology can already be found 
to exist- in the term sui generis. Characterizing Aboriginal rights as sui generis 
reflects the acknowledgement that these rights derive their meaning and very 
existence from Aboriginal legal and political sources along with the common law. 
Borrows argues that the sui generis doctrine encapsulates the balance and interplay 
between similarity and difference that exists (or ought to exist) between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal communities.  
 
The sui generis doctrine expresses the confidence that there are 
sufficient similarities between the groups to enable them to live with their 
differences. Under this doctrine, points of agreement can be highlighted 
and issues of difference can be preserved to facilitate more productive 
and peaceful relations. The sui generis doctrine reformulates similarity 
and difference and thereby captures the complex, overlapping, and 
exclusive identities and relationships of the parties.36(emphasis added) 
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There is a potential contradiction between arguing for the development of a sui 
generis form of law while at the same time arguing for the preservation of difference. 
Borrows’ preferred vision of legal pluralism is not one that entails a simple expansion 
of existing legal and political institutions to include Aboriginal perspectives (although 
this is definitely one aspect of his argument), but rather, a co-mingling of legal 
knowledges and orders that would in effect create something entirely unique, or sui 
generis. Borrows’ concept of a sui generis legal order challenges an economy of 
similarities (or ‘sameness’) and ‘difference’ which rely upon reified or essentialist 
understandings of cultural difference in order to envision the creation of a unique 
order of law and legal knowledges. 
 
C. Re-mapping the rule of law  
In Chapter 4, Borrows renders a stunning and detailed analysis of Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia.37 Among the many arguments that he makes, he exposes the 
“myth of sovereignty” in his analysis of the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Canada.38  The Court refuses to question the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty, and 
its basis remains nothing other than self-assertion.39 This continual refusal to 
question the legitimacy of colonial sovereignty enables the characterization of 
Aboriginal title as a mere burden on underlying Crown title.  
This critique of the colonial assertion of sovereignty and its continual 
reiteration in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence is set within a larger critique of a liberal 
form of rights. Borrows- with the assistance of the Trickster who readily performs 
several deconstructive moves throughout the text- explores how the notion of 
‘equality’ can be used to promote the rights of any individual or group- in spite of the 
relations of power that structure and situate individuals differently in relation to one 
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another. The first exemplar of the ‘myth’ of ‘equality’ was the proposed White Paper 
of the Liberal government in 1969, which contained policies that were aimed at the 
assimilation of Aboriginal peoples as the means to achieving equality among all. 
Raven “sees how the promise of equality can become a pretext for eliminating 
different ways of evaluating life.”40 
Leaping to the present day, Raven (in the guise of a well known member of 
the media) provocatively makes a speech during a time of debate over the Nisga’a 
Final Agreement in which he speaks of “race based entitlements” and segregation. 
By invoking popular arguments about the perils of “special group rights” that were 
used by opponents of the Treaty, Raven is actually referring to the race based 
entitlements historically enjoyed initially by white European settlers, and then later, by 
other non-Aboriginal immigrants. The Trickster “wonders who [the audience] will see 
in his words, and to whom they will attribute wisdom and foolishness.”41 
Borrows points to the malleability of the concept of ‘equality’ within a liberal 
legal paradigm. Divorced from history and context, from relations of power that create 
systemic privilege, the ideal of ‘equality’ (along with a host of other human rights) is 
capable of being utilized by any group who perceives ‘discrimination’- which in the 
case of non-Aboriginal peoples’ opposition to the Nisga’a Final Agreement is more 
appropriately characterized as a potential loss of privilege that was created through 
the colonial subjugation of other peoples.42  
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Borrows critiques the unilateral declaration of Crown sovereignty that became 
the basis for the legitimisation of the extinguishment or infringement of Aboriginal 
rights prior to 1982.43 He points out the myriad flaws with Aboriginal rights doctrine 
that severely limit the constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights in s.35 of the 
Constitution, a recognition of rights that could have given way to a just reconciling of 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal sovereignties.44 Despite his critiques however, 
Borrows wants to base his claim for justice on traditional legal principles, in particular, 
the rule of law, along with federalism, democracy and the respect for minorities.  
Borrows rightfully critiques the refusal of the Court to question the legitimacy of the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty, the “frozen rights” approach to Aboriginal rights 
doctrine, the denial of Aboriginal perspectives of their rights and rights claims, and 
the continued marginalisation of the fact that Aboriginal peoples did not consent to 
the extinguishment of their rights and entitlements, in light of the contemporary 
disavowal of the colonial ideologies that underlay the settlement of Canada. 
However, I argue that contemporary understandings of ‘humanity’ as now including 
those peoples who were previously seen by Europeans as backwards and 
uncivilized, and therefore appropriate beings for colonial subjugation, and the law 
that facilitated this colonization, cannot be neatly divorced from one another. That is, 
the contemporary disavowal of ideologies of the past that underlay colonization 
cannot be neatly mapped onto foundational legal tenets such as rule of law. Rather, it 
is my view that such concepts also have a history – replete with blood and violence- 
                                                                                                                                       
Even the perceived loss of privilege with the recognition of an Aboriginal treaty right to fish has 
sparked violence on the part of non-Aboriginal fishermen. Throughout the fall of 1999, Aboriginal 
fishermen on the east coast faced physical violence and harassment at the hands of non-Aboriginal 
fisherman after the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed the treaty right of the Mi’kmaq people to trade 
(fish) for necessaries. (See R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456) The storm of protest on the part of non-
Aboriginal fishermen and the motion for a re-hearing and a stay by the West Nova Fishermen’s Coalition 
resulted in a further judgment, in which the Court clarified its initial judgment and reassured the 
petitioners that they had not affirmed a treaty right that was not subject to State regulation. (R. v. 
Marshall  [No.2] [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533). The Court explained to the petitioners that the issue of whether 
the federal fishery regulations under which Donald Marshall had been charged were a justifiable 
limitation on the Mi’kmaq treaty right was not before the Court as the Crown had not made any such 
argument. Having found an Aboriginal treaty right to trade fish for necessaries, Donald Marshall was 
entitled to be acquitted of the charges of fishing out of season and other, related charges.  
43
 Borrows, 108 
44
 Borrows, 97 
 16 
that cannot simply be emptied out and re-inscribed with new meaning in a clean, 
post-colonial sweep towards justice. 
 
PART II. RE-COVERING THE LIMITS: CALLING INTO QUESTION A POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE  
I have identified three different questions about the type of pluralism 
envisioned by Borrows and the limits of current form of recognition in the Canadian 
context. The first two issues relate to problems inherent in the politics of difference 
that underlies recognition, which in my view, Borrows successfully transcends. The 
third question is a critique of Borrows’ reliance on fundamental legal tenets as the 
appropriate means through which to realise his radical legal pluralism. 
The first question is about the potential for recognizing difference within a 
paradigm of recognition. What is the nature of the difference that is recognized? Is 
there space within a theory of mutual recognition for the recognition of a difference 
that encompasses ways of being, and relations between beings that derive from 
‘other’ epistemological and ontological grounds?  I argue that currently, the difference 
that is recognized within Aboriginal rights caselaw is only that which is proper to the 
self (or subject) who is already in existence. This is in large part due to the fact that 
(perhaps with the influence of the ideology of official multiculturalism in Canada), the 
difference that is recognized (and preserved) through Aboriginal rights claims is 
limited to the recognition of a cultural identity of “Aboriginality”. The cultural difference 
that is recognized is defined as that which is proper to the existing political, economic 
and legal structures of the Canadian state. Defining Aboriginal difference in terms of 
cultural difference prevents a rupture of existing relations of power, rooted in the 
history of colonial settlement, which enables one entity to bestow recognition upon 
the party seeking legal rights from the state. In order for a meaningful shift towards a 
post-colonial political community, ‘difference’ would have to be defined in a way that 
accounts for the material, ontological and epistemological aspects of subject 
formation and rights claims.  
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I argue that the legal changes and transformation Borrows proposes, the 
result of which can be characterized as sui generis law, rupture the boundaries of a 
restricted economy of recognition. The concept of sui generis law requires a 
substantive transformation of the colonial foundations of the legal system and the 
political-philosophical concepts that underlie governance and the economy. Given 
that the only difference that is cognisable within a paradigm of recognition is that 
which is proper to what already exists, I argue that the radical changes that would 
result from such a ‘co-mingling of legal orders’ could not be realised within the 
bounds of the recognition of cultural difference as it currently operates in the 
Canadian context. 
The second question takes a slightly different point of departure. While a 
theory of recognition allows for the transformation of the subject or in this case, the 
nation, through the process of the mutual recognition of different communities, it also 
facilitates the preservation of ‘difference’. If we accept Borrows’ proposition that a 
melding of different legal orders is possible, in such a way as to create something 
new and unique but at the same time to preserve the integrity of these different 
strands of legal orders, is the preservation of cultural difference, with its problems of 
essence and authenticity possible or even desirable?  
The final question I raise is about the basis upon which Borrows argues for a 
new legal and political order. He argues for the application of foundational concepts 
such as the rule of law, federalism, democracy and the respect for minorities in the 
move towards creating a just foundation for the Canadian state. My question 
concerns the rule of law, and the concept of sovereignty to which it is bound. Can the 
very radical notions of decolonisation (expressed in the first four chapters) be 
realized through the use of concepts such as the rule of law? How can concepts such 
as the ‘rule of law’ and ‘sovereignty’ which lay at the very foundation of colonial rule 




A. The essence of (cultural) difference and Hegel’s dialectic of recognition 
Within the paradigm of ‘difference’, difference has been defined as “cultural” 
difference. Charles Taylor’s seminal essay on the topic, “The Politics of Recognition” 
emphasizes the centrality of the recognition of identity- as cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness45- to freedom from oppression and social harms.46 It is the mis- or 
non-recognition of people’s identities that have contributed to a self-image of 
inferiority and other ills.47  The mutual recognition of identities by equals is the means 
to allowing individuals and cultural (linguistic) communities to attain full self-hood, 
equality and dignity.48 
Taylor takes the dialectic of mutual recognition from Hegel, and transposes it into 
contemporary political and social struggles in the Canadian context, most notably, 
the struggle of the Quebecois for self-determination. Taylor defines identity as a term 
that “designates something like a person’s understanding of who they are, of their 
fundamental defining characteristics as a human being”49 and also “who we are, 
‘where we’re coming from’”.50 The universal quality that grounds the politics of 
difference (i.e. that quality or thing that provides sufficient similarity for all human 
beings to co-exist) is “the potential for forming and defining one’s own identity, as an 
individual, and also as a culture.”51 There is an important movement (or slippage) 
here from the individual to the cultural ‘community’ or collective.  The leap from the 
desire for recognition of the modern individualist self to that of the social collectivity 
presents some difficulties. Taylor deals with this by way of reference to Herder, 
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another major influence on his theory of multiculturalism: “I should note here that 
Herder applied his conception of originality at two levels, not only to the individual 
person among other persons, but also the culture-bearing people among other 
peoples. Just like individuals, a Volk should be true to itself, that is, its own culture.”52   
Mutual recognition between individual subjects occurs on the basis that the 
universal similarity between subjects is nothing else but the desire for recognition by 
another. Putting this desire into action, or petitioning or addressing the other for 
recognition- even before the recognition is realized- is a transformative process for 
the subject.53 While the term “culture” can signify a wide range of practices, 
knowledges, and ways of being, when placed in the paradigm of recognition, the 
fluidity and constantly changing nature of cultural practices becomes difficult, if not 
impossible to maintain when the phenomenon of recognition is transposed into a 
liberal democratic rights regime.  The address or petition for recognition, when made 
by a cultural community, is on the basis of a difference that has to already be in 
existence if it is to be recognized. This means that in the act of a community 
representing itself as having a particular cultural identity, the fluidity, contingency and 
movement that is actually characteristic of practises and ‘traditions’ in cultural 
communities is captured. As Butler points out, this is inevitable in the context of 
asserting rights and claiming legal protection on the basis of membership in a group 
or class.54 She also notes that wrenching this ‘captured’ identity away from an 
understanding of who we are in a more general or broad sense is very difficult.55 
Taylor, on the other hand, doesn’t seem to distinguish between the relative 
“artificiality” of identity as it is represented within a liberal-legal paradigm, and what 
we really are about, which is a set of fluid, changing, fragmented and non-unitary 
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subjectivities. The failure of Taylor and the realities of a liberal rights paradigm 
conflate to inhibit the potential for transformation that exists in the process of 
recognition. The problems of reified cultural identities, which are premised on 
exclusionary essences rear their heads once again.  
As a result, while the freedom to live and exist in a way that mirrors your self-
understanding and expression of “who you are and where you are coming from” is, at 
face value, a desirable objective, it falls far short of the kind of radical transformation 
in relations between individual beings and communities- and indeed- the formation of 
political community itself- that is necessary for a move towards decolonisation. The 
recognition of different cultural identities leaves existing political and economic 
structures intact, and does not push the boundaries of existing social relations past 
the point of “tolerance” of cultural differences.  
Borrows has pointed out the problems with relying on colonialist conceptions 
of Aboriginal culture as being “traditional” and static. He argues against this 
approach, and for the recognition of Aboriginal rights on the basis of Indigenous laws 
and customs. This raises the question of whether the concept of ‘difference’, within a 
paradigm of recognition, is capable of encompassing normative principles, values, 
and alternate epistemological foundations that ground Indigenous laws in different 
ways from Anglo-American legal principles. I argue that the recognition of difference 
is limited not only because of the content of this “difference”- i.e. cultural difference 
that has to be represented in a bounded way for the purposes of rights claims- but at 
a more fundamental level, ‘difference’ is recognized only when it is properly different 
to that which is the ‘same’.  
The argument that the politics of difference only allows for a difference that is 
proper to what already exists raises the more fundamental question about the nature 
of difference within the Hegelian dialectic of recognition. This question is complex 
and even a tentative conclusion cannot be drawn without exploring Hegel’s theory of 
mutual recognition. In the context of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition, the formation of 
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the subject takes place through the mutual recognition of each other’s Being.56 The 
master-slave dialectic is perhaps the most well known dimension of the dialectic of 
mutual recognition and I start my discussion with this scene in mind. 
At the initial stage of the master-slave dialectic, and this stage of the 
development of self-consciousness, man seeks recognition from other men but has 
yet to see- and has failed to see- how he relates to (or is) the universal. In this failure, 
he has failed to see other men as beings equal to himself, but only sees the reflection 
of his own self in these men.57 The main principle man grasps is his superiority to 
others, and thus feels compelled to overcome this other in order to prove his 
superiority. Unlike at later stages, at this early stage man fails to recognize how 
recognition is “something that in principle should be extended to all.”58 Recognition is 
not a mutual endeavour at this stage, but a kind of recognition that can only come to 
be in a situation of domination or war or even, and ultimately, the annihilation of the 
other.  
However, annihilation defeats the purpose of the struggle for recognition. If I 
die, recognition is a moot issue. If the other dies, there is no other to give me the 
recognition I require. What is necessary is a “standing”59 or a “living”60 death in which 
my other is overcome but remains in existence. The realization of the need for the 
“living death” of my other is the initial resolution of the paradox between the desire to 
annihilate or overcome the other in seeking recognition from him, which would leave 
me without recognition. The need for recognition becomes mutual.61  
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What is required by the self-consciousness struggling for recognition is a 
relationship with the (or its) other which will reflect the reality of self-consciousness’ 
being as an “emanation of universal Geist.”62 The realization of each subject’s 
relationship to the universal, and the desire to create and to be sustained by an 
external reality that reflects this relationship, requires recognition by an other human 
being who “will annul its own foreignness, [but] in which the subject can nevertheless 
find himself.”63 This recognition is found not as or in an(other) human being existing 
merely as a subject in existence-for-itself, but as - and in - a human being who 
recognizes the humanity of the self-consciousness seeking recognition.  
Hegel’s theory of the coming into being of the subject and intersubjective 
relations are two aspects of the same process; self-consciousness cannot come into 
being fully without the recognition of an other self-consciousness, and without the 
other who is simultaneously seeking the recognition of the other self-consciousness 
as well. In the context of this double signification, where self-consciousness comes 
into being through a kind of mutual recognition, it “comes out of itself” and appears to 
posit its other. Self-consciousness posits its other insofar as it believes, mistakenly, 
that the other (self-consciousness) is not independent (when in fact it is). Self-
consciousness, in the initial moment, overcomes its other. The self splits; “the middle 
breaks forth into extremes;” one of which is the merely recognized, and the other is 
the merely recognizing.64 Each extreme exists in opposition to the other; and the 
opposition is overcome as they each transform into their opposites. But what of the 
middle term, self-consciousness?  
 
Although, as consciousness, it does indeed come out of itself, yet, though 
out of itself, it is at the same time kept back within itself, is for itself, and 
the self outside it, is for it. It is aware that it at once is, and is not, another 
consciousness, and equally that this other is for itself only when it 
supersedes itself as being for itself, and is for itself only in the being-for-
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self of the other. Each is for the other the middle term, through which 
each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for 
itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, 
which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They 
recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.65 (emphasis 
added) 
 
We can see from this passage that each self-consciousness relies upon another 
independently existing self-consciousness to similarly transform itself. Self-
consciousness seems to be both another consciousness and independent of this 
other consciousness. Gillian Rose offers an interpretation of the presentation of 
otherness in Hegel’s dialectic in the following terms:  
 
[T]he separation out of otherness as such is derived from the failure of 
mutual recognition on the part of two self-consciousnesses who 
encounter each other and refuse to recognise the other as itself a self-
relation. This applies to oneself as other and, equally, to any opposing 
self-consciousness: my relation to myself is mediated by what I recognise 
or refuse to recognize in your relation to yourself; while your self-relation 
depends on what you recognize of my relation to myself.66   
 
In this passage, Rose makes the profoundly intersubjective nature of the 
Hegelian dialectic clear. This aspect of recognition is represented as the activity of 
only one self-consciousness, and thus it appears that self-consciousness posits its 
other, and the action is that of only one self-consciousness. However, “the other is 
equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not 
itself the origin.” 67 The action that is necessary for recognition is both that of each 
self-consciousness acting individually; it is of double significance because it is the 
action of each self-consciousness acting against itself as well as against the other 
self-consciousness.  
One conclusion to draw from this aspect of Hegel’s theory of the subject (self-
consciousness “A”) and intersubjectivity is that the other (self-consciousness “B”) is 
uniquely different and independent from the subject. That is, B is uniquely different 
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and independent from A. And certainly, those scholars who laud the political and 
ethical dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity do so because of the 
“respect for difference” that it is seen to entail. Moreover, I argue that this reading of 
the dialectic of recognition is equally as plausible as the critique that follows; the 
outcome of the drama of recognition is contingent upon the circumstances in which it 
unfolds.  
However, a more critical reading of this dialectic questions the nature of 
difference that is cognisable within a recognition paradigm. Recall that the ‘other’ is 
simultaneously posited by the self as one extreme aspect of itself, while it is also an 
independently existing self-consciousness in its own right. How can the particularity, 
or the difference of the other be said to be kept intact when each self-consciousness 
requires and relies upon another self-consciousness that necessarily moves towards 
it own becoming and its other in an identical fashion? What is the nature of difference 
when what is required by self-consciousness is the recognition of an other that is 
already designated as a reflection of itself? The other that is required for mutual 
recognition is one which posits its own other, “comes out itself”, and is then absorbed 
and superceded by itself and its other in an act of mutual recognition and 
reconciliation (aufhebung). The other that is required by self-consciousness is both a 
reflection of self-consciousness and also an independently existing other self-
consciousness- but identical, in many respects, to self-consciousness nonetheless.  
Jean-Luc Nancy states this problematic in the following way: 
 
[I]dentity, while pulling itself together, assumes and resorbs within itself 
the differences that constitute it: both its difference from the other, whom 
it posits as such, and its difference from itself, simultaneously implied and 
abolished in the movement of “grasping itself.” In this way, finally, identity 
makes difference: it presents itself as preeminently different from all other 
identity and from all nonidentity; relating itself to itself, it relegates the 
other to a self (or to an absence of self) that is different. Being the very 
movement proper to self-consciousness, identity- or the Self that 
identifies itself- therefore makes difference itself, difference proper: and 
this property designates or denotes itself as “man.”68 
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Identities of the self and the other- as difference- come to exist as properties in and 
of themselves. The difference that is posited by the Self is one that is proper to the 
Self or subject. This difference becomes property in that it designates the human as 
human, or the subject as human;69 this is property in the sense of being a 
characteristic proper to the subject, and also something that is knowable, 
quantifiable, tangible, capable of being possessed.  
The proper(tied) nature of identity and difference fits within an ontological 
“economy of the same”70 in which difference is not really difference at all, but a 
presupposed, assumed counterpart to the self-same subject. If, as Nancy postulates, 
“the life of spirit does not tremble before its own differentiation, not even in death, for 
there too it maintains itself,” the question that remains is “where can a different 
identity come from? From where can B come to A?71   
 Hegel maintains that while self-consciousness may be represented as the 
journey and transformation of one self-consciousness, the other is originarily 
independent and self-contained.72 Nancy responds to this insistent assertion of the 
independent “origin” of the other self-consciousness by stating that the “the path of 
self-consciousness can easily lead through desire and recognition of the other, but it 
is traced beforehand as the circular process of the Self of this consciousness.”73  
Nancy’s critique challenges the notion that there is any space within the 
Hegelian dialectic of recognition for the existence of alterity. The difference that is 
recognized is only ever that which is proper to what has already been established (or 
represented) as ‘man’ (or ‘humanity’). Placing this critique in the context of the 
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recognition of Aboriginal difference, I want to suggest that the difference that is 
recognized is that which is proper to what has already been established as the 
boundaries of the liberal democratic capitalist state. Thus the “frozen rights 
approach”, to take one example, can be understood as a positing of Aboriginal rights 
and practices in a time and space that is separate and distinct from the 
contemporary, post-colonial order in order to avoid any disruptions of the ‘present’. 
The recognition and acceptance of differences between communities (within the 
boundaries of one nation state) in political organization, economic ideologies and 
practices, land and resource use, would bend the overarching structure of the nation 
state out of shape and radically alter its boundaries. This is desirable and necessary 
in the context of decolonization- and while I do want to conclude that this is 
impossible within a dialectic of recognition, it has not been realized in the colonial 
settler context that denies the recognition of difference beyond the bounds of cultural 
difference.  
 There is ample evidence in the caselaw to support this view. In the Canadian 
context, the recognition of the proper Aboriginality is accomplished through the 
language of cultural distinctiveness, with its criteria of primordial, authentic essence 
that is consistently used by the courts to narrow or limit the recognition of an 
Aboriginal right.74 Where the Courts do recognize an activity as an Aboriginal right 
that is commercial in nature, they take steps to circumscribe it in the interests of the 
“broader social and political community” in which Aboriginal peoples live. Aboriginal 
rights are being limited “where the objectives of those limitations are of sufficient 
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importance to the broader [non-Aboriginal] community as a whole.”75 This aspect of 
Aboriginal rights doctrine, perhaps more clearly than any other, illustrates the 
violence that is inherent in the process of recognition as it is currently configured 
within a politics of difference.     
The way in which the Court has developed the doctrines of limitation and 
justification re-inscribes the originary violence of the colonial assertion of sovereignty 
and proceeds to discipline and regulate Aboriginal communities in a way that is 
proper to and consistent with Canada’s status as a post-colonial settler society. The 
test for a justifiable limitation of an Aboriginal right was first established in Sparrow. In 
determining whether a right has been infringed, the Court makes three inquiries: 
whether the limitation on the right is reasonable; whether the regulation at issue 
imposes undue hardship; and whether the regulation denies holders of the right their 
preferred means of exercising the right.76 After determining whether there has been 
an infringement according to these three criteria, the Court then inquires as to 
whether the infringement can be justified. The test for justification of the infringement 
of Aboriginal rights mirrors the structure of the Oakes77 test under section 1 of the 
Charter.  
Although the Aboriginal rights recognized by section 35(1) are, as was 
noted in Van der Peet, fundamentally different from the rights in the 
Charter, the same basic principle- that the purposes underlying the rights 
must inform not only the definition of the rights but also the identification 
of those limits on the rights which are justifiable- applies equally to the 
justification analysis under s.35(1).78 
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Aboriginal rights, which are recognized by virtue of Aboriginal peoples’ prior 
occupation of the lands, are fundamentally different from rights under the Charter, to 
which every Canadian is entitled. In Van der Peet the majority found the 
reconciliation of the prior occupancy of Aboriginal peoples with Crown sovereignty to 
be the primary purpose of s.35(1). The fact of prior occupancy, above any other 
facts, distinguishes ‘Aboriginal peoples from all other minority groups in Canadian 
society and mandates their special legal and constitutional status.’79 If this is so, why 
is the doctrine of justification the same in structure as the Oakes test?80 The 
justification test applied to Aboriginal rights takes on a form and content that is very 
similar to the Oakes test, masking the very important differences between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal communities, and their respective relationships to the state. 
Aboriginal rights are hastily folded back into the existing paradigm of rights discourse 
in order to “stem the tide” that is unleashed with the acknowledgment of their prior 
presence on the land.  
For example, in Gladstone, the issue before the Court was whether the 
federal government’s Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations, SOR/84-324 were “of no 
force or effect” by operation of s.52 of the Constitution Act because they infringed the 
appellant’s s.35 right to sell herring spawn on kelp. The Court found that there had 
been a prima facie infringement of the rights of the appellant. Although the Court 
ultimately concludes there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the 
objectives of the government’s regulations satisfied the requirement that they be 
compelling and substantial, the Court makes a number of important and interesting 
statements in the course of delineating the test for justification. The Court notes that 
“prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America,” the Heiltsuk people engaged in 
the harvesting of herring spawn on kelp “to the extent they themselves desired.” This 
activity was only subject to limitations presented by “difficulties in transportation, 
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preservation and resource availability, as well as those limitations that they thought 
advisable to impose for the purposes of conservation.” 81 Quoting from Sparrow, the 
Court notes that the requirement that the government regulations have a valid 
legislative objective would potentially be satisfied by the curtailing of an Aboriginal 
right in the interests of “preserving” the section 35(1) right itself. As Dickson C.J. and 
La Forest J. wrote in Sparrow,  “[legislative] objectives purporting to prevent the 
exercise of s.35(1) rights that would cause harm to the general populace or to 
Aboriginal peoples themselves,” would also be valid.82 This approach does nothing to 
address the colonial practices that have endangered the fishing stocks in the first 
place.83 This history is smoothed over by the promise that the Sovereign will protect 
the s.35 right by prioritizing Aboriginal communities’ interests and upholding their 
fiduciary duty towards Aboriginal peoples. 
The Sovereign power determines and regulates the extent to which an 
Aboriginal right may be exercised. The prospect of reconciliation is set in motion as 
the profound power imbalance between Aboriginal communities and the non-
Aboriginal society (to which they stand in opposition when it comes to a “balancing” 
of rights and interests) is not accounted for in the course of deciding whether a 
limitation on an Aboriginal right is justifiable. The justification test posits the 
recognition of Aboriginal rights- and the limitations of those rights in the interests of 
the broader community as a whole- as equally as important to reconciliation, thereby 
ignoring the reality that many of these rights have not been recognized or practiced 
by Aboriginal peoples throughout the history of colonial settlement. And where these 
rights have been exercised, they have often been limited in the interests of the non-
Aboriginal majority. 
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Where the Aboriginal right engaged involves economic resources, the Court 
has tended to circumscribe the right more narrowly, and widen the parameters of 
what constitutes a justifiable limitation on the exercise of that right. In Sparrow, the 
right claimed was a right to fish for food, a right which has an inherent limit. There is 
only so much fish that is required to fulfill this need for food of a particular community. 
Commercial fisheries, however, which respond to the needs of an insatiable market, 
have no such limit. The economic development of mines and forests is similarly only 
restrained by a limit point determined by the people in charge of regulating the 
exploitation of such resources. Where the Aboriginal right being claimed confronts 
the economic development of the province or involves capitalist enterprises such as 
the commercial fishery, the rights and limitation analyses, as well as the justification 
tests, take on different contours. 
Thus in Delgamuukw, the Court finds practically any activity that has as its 
objective the promotion of economic development in the interior of the province of 
British Columbia can legitimately infringe an Aboriginal right to title over that land: 
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and 
hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of 
British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, 
the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to 
support those aims are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with 
this purpose, and in principle, can justify the infringement of Aboriginal 
title.84 
 
It is telling that practically any activity that promotes the interests of the foreign settler 
population can “in principle” justify the infringement of Aboriginal title. In Van der 
Peet, the claimant characterized her claim as the right “to sufficient fish to provide for 
a moderate livelihood.”85 The Court re-characterized her claim, as noted above, as 
the right to exchange fish for money or other goods. The majority concludes that 
although members of the Sto:lo society did engage in the exchange of fish, it was not 
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a “central, significant or defining feature of Sto:lo society.”86 The anthropological 
evidence described throughout the judgment reveals how the exchange of fish was a 
part of the regular activities of the Sto:lo society. The Court finds that as there was no 
“regularized trading system” prior to the arrival of the Hudson’s Bay Company, at 
least in the sense of a commercial, capitalist sense, the exchange of fish was not 
sufficiently widespread so as to constitute a  “defining feature” of that society. Trading 
fish with the Hudson’s Bay Company does not fulfill the requirements for the rights 
test because the activity must have been a defining feature of the Aboriginal society 
prior to contact with Europeans.  
While fishing for food is seen to be a “defining” aspect of Sto:lo society, (as 
one would imagine is the case with any coastal community), “incidental” daily 
practices, such as trading fish for money in order to earn a “moderate livelihood” do 
not fall within the parameters of Aboriginal rights. What is being reconciled with the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty are activities and practices which, from the point of 
view of the settler society, were defining features of that community. Anything else 
that was and is considered “incidental” to such defining characteristics fall outside of 
the rights “box.”87 
This type of reasoning was recently repeated in Mitchell v. M.N.R.  [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 911 (on appeal from the Federal Court), where the Court disagreed with the 
trial judge and Court of Appeal who found that the Mohawk of Akwesasne engaged in 
trade north of the St. Lawrence River (and what is now the U.S.-Canada border) prior 
to contact with Europeans. The Court went on to conclude that even if they 
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acknowledged the existence of such trade, it was not an “integral” aspect or 
“defining” character of this Mohawk community.88 The Court finds the following: 
 
[Trading goods across the St. Lawrence River] was not vital to the 
Mohawk’s collective identity. It was not something that “truly made the 
society what it was” (Van der Peet, at para 55 (emphasis in original)). 
Participation in northerly trade was therefore not a practice integral to the 
distinctive culture of the Mohawk people.89 
   
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which trade for commercial purposes could ever 
be characterized as a defining cultural feature of any society, or to turn this 
proposition around, where commercial activities could ever be separated from the 
defining cultural features of any society. 
It is apparent that the recognition of Aboriginal rights is circumscribed by an 
economy of difference in which that which is recognized is always already proper to 
existing political, legal and economic structures. “Culture” and cultural difference is 
the particular modality through which any ‘difference’ that would transform the 
existing whole that is the nation is contained. The desires of Aboriginal rights 
claimants are continually negated in this process. Does the concept of a sui generis 
legal take us beyond these limits? 
 
B. The persistence of essence and authenticity: sui generis transformation or 
the preservation of difference? 
 
 
As discussed above, Borrows argues for the co-mingling of different legal 
orders that would result in a sui generis law. In the Anishinabek90 legal narratives that 
Borrows presents animals and non-human life, along with other generations (both 
‘past’ and ‘future’) are represented. It is not just that animals and plant life are 
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considered as important resources or commodities and are for those reasons, placed 
at the heart of the legal consideration of issues of resource use. Rather, the animal-
human distinction which undergirds most if not all of an androcentric western 
philosophical tradition is very much reconfigured within Anishinabek ‘ontology’ or 
philosophy of being. This reflects a disjuncture that cannot be contained within the 
word ‘difference’.  
Borrows illustrates how Aboriginal laws could be usefully deployed in the 
context of environment and planning law. Borrows draws upon Aboriginal legal 
knowledge and relays it in a form cognisable to those versed in western common law 
concepts. He relays a combination of Anishinabek stories, putting them into a 
caselaw format, to illustrate both the ‘stability and flexibility’ of Anishinabek law and 
also to show that it is a ‘combination of First Nations stories that create law.’ (16) In 
these stories, it becomes clear that Anishinabek law reflects epistemological and 
ontological foundations whose difference from a western history of philosophy is 
immense. 
Several aspects of Nanabush v. Deer, Wolf et al91, for instance, reflect a 
radical departure from western legal and philosophical precepts. To begin with, the 
case takes place in the “distant mists of time”. The temporality of the stories being 
relayed are neither linear nor cyclical; certainly, they are a part of an oral history 
tradition that is passed down through generations, but there is no exact point of 
departure for this particular case as it is reinterpreted with each telling in order so that 
it may be responsive to ever-evolving contemporary circumstances. Second, the 
legal principles that we might derive from the case include the principle of inter-
relation between animals and human life. However, this is not only a recognition of 
interdependency, these principles derive from stories in which animals have agency; 
their actions (like the passive observations of the deer during the battle of the birds 
against the Anishinabek nation) are interpreted as significant indications of what the 
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outcome ought to be. The value system which shapes the legal determination or 
outcome includes the needs of animals - as placed within a larger economy of 
interdependency between non-animal, animal, and human life.92 
Although Borrows does not use the word “capitalism”, he notes that North 
American democratic systems are under pressure to maintain current levels of 
material consumption and the requisite economic activity; this pressure is 
exacerbated by “a hegemonic alignment of interests, institutions, and ideas that 
enable some to gain enormous political and economic power by over-exploiting the 
environment.”93 I think that Aboriginal legal knowledge is meant to entail approaches 
to resource use and land use planning that are different from current environmental 
concerns about the exploitation of the environment by rampant capitalist forces. 
Borrows argues for a reconfiguring of the relationship between humans, animals and 
their environment, one that accounts for the “literal connection and interaction 
between those things in the environment that act to use their surroundings, and those 
that are acted upon.” In arguing that “[a] compact between humans and their 
surroundings must be considered when humans make governmental decisions about 
themselves and their neighbours”94 Borrows advocates for a democracy in which the 
interests of non-human elements are represented within the polity.  
However, the liberal democratic capitalist system which is ‘straining to sustain 
the current level of economic activity and material consumption’ is premised on a 
view of animal and ‘plant’ life, of forests, rivers, and entire eco-systems as commodity 
objects to be exploited for the benefit of humans. The shift to a different social 
contract or “treaty”95 between human, animals and the environment would undermine 
the very foundation of laws (resource law, property law, land use planning law, etc..)  
that are implicated in and buttress a liberal capitalist legal order.  
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My question is not whether this type of change is desirable (indeed it is), but 
whether this transformation of existing modes of land and resource use and the laws 
that structure such uses can be accomplished within a paradigm of recognition. The 
‘recognition’ and realization in practice of Aboriginal concepts such as treaties and 
covenants between humans and the environment- and the different configuration of 
the distinction between human, animal and environment would not leave the overall 
legal and political structure intact. Borrows is not arguing for the exceptional 
allowance of (some) different modes of land and resource use. The forging of a “truly 
North American law”96 in the context of environmental law would require the fusing or 
melding of different conceptions of the relationship between humans, animals and 
the environment, as well as a deep re-evaluation of the conceptualisation of animals 
and the environment as mere commodity objects available for human use. The 
knowledges and ways of being that Borrows is seeking to assert as in need of legal 
and constitutional protection cannot be described, in shorthand, as cultural 
difference. 
The transformation of environmental law and resource use would result in a 
type of law that would not be recognizably Aboriginal or Anglo-American, but 
something quite unique unto itself, that is, sui generis. Borrows’ vision of the 
transformation of Aboriginal and Anglo-American legal orders into a new body of law, 
while the difference of its component parts is maintained could be said to reflect the 
accomplishment of a dialectic of recognition. Hegel’s concept of the dialectical 
resolution of a contradiction or opposition, encapsulated by the term Aufhebung, 
reflects a moment in which difference is overcome in [a] unity but is also preserved. 
In the words of Hegel,  “it is a “difference which, in itself, is no difference.”97 However, 
even if we accept that the concept of a sui generis body of law were to resolve the 
apparent oppositions between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legal knowledges, while 
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at the same time, preserving their differences, the problem of essence would rear its 
head again. 
This is not to deny that there are differences between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal communities; my aim is to question how this difference is characterized 
within a paradigm of rights, and what aspects of these differences are relevant to the 
formation of political community and its relationship to law.  Borrows advocates for 
the conceptualisation of Aboriginal rights on the basis of practices that are necessary 
for the cultural and physical survival of the community. The notion of “Aboriginality” 
persists in his conception of rights, along with the desire to “preserve difference”. 
Why does the desire to preserve (cultural) difference persist? How can we 
advocate, as Borrows does, for a notion of community that is not defined through a 
notion of biologically based or socially constructed racial difference, nor through 
simple territorial boundaries, kinship, or notions of tradition and culture as static and 
unchanging98, and at the same time, desire the preservation of a ‘difference’ that can 
only be (‘different’) if it maintains an essential difference in relation to other discrete 
communities? I think it is useful to separate the desire for the continual existence and 
realization of  “community” as a place where particular epistemological and 
ontological frames for how individuals relate to each other and their environment can 
flourish- from the desire to preserve this set of differences in the name of (the much 
more limited idea of) “cultural” difference.99 I render this critique reluctantly, because 
Borrows writes in the context of a very real backlash and resistance to the notion of 
Aboriginal rights.100  I am sympathetic to the view that in the face of a history of 
attempted genocide and myriad forms of repression, naming resistance to colonial 
practices as ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘indigenous’ is important and perhaps unavoidable. 
However, I argue that at the same time, we need to name this politics of resistance 
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and post-coloniality differently, in such as way as to heed Fanon’s call of avoiding the 
pitfalls of (ethnic, racial) national consciousness.    
 
C. Rehabilitating the rule of law: casting ourselves into a space of ‘unfreedom’  
 
Borrows’ discussion of the rule of law is “motivated by the very conservative notion 
that the consistent application of the rule of law and the inclusion of Aboriginal 
perspectives can provide an important bulwark against arbitrariness and 
oppression.”101 From the perspective of Aboriginal communities, the arbitrary 
assertion of Crown sovereignty has caused (and continues to cause) severe 
disruptions, chaos and even near-anarchy. In reaching back to Aristotle for a 
definition of “rightly constituted laws” as the “final sovereign”, as complete, non-
arbitrary and unbiased, Borrows posits the rule of law as a transcendent ideal that 
can be realized ‘now’ if a consensual, unbiased, inclusive, and non-arbitrary 
approach to the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty is undertaken. However, in positing 
the use of law and the legal justifications for the appropriation of Aboriginal land, 
creation of reserves, and myriad other forms of political and economic subjugation of 
Aboriginal peoples as simply ‘wrong’ or in breach of the real or true ideal of the rule 
of law, I think Borrows lets ‘the law off the hook’ too easily.  
At the time of settlement, the assertion of Crown sovereignty was 
accomplished in the name of ‘the rule of law’ that Borrows wants to rely upon as the 
basis for a just legal and political order. As Fitzpatrick writes:  
 
[E]very tale of law’s bringing order to disordered times and places, along 
with the triumph of such things as modernity or capitalist social relations, 
can be matched by others where it created uncertainty and inflicted 
massive disorder in the same cause.102 
 
The ‘rule of law’ was used as a basis for the establishment of colonial sovereignty, 
bringing such things as order, stability and peace to colonial settler society. At the 
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same time, it caused massive disruption for the colonized. The rule of law is 
intimately connected to the very same colonial ‘sovereignty’ that Borrows would like 
to call into question. The rule of law, in fact, could be seen to depend on sovereignty 
itself. The rule of law depends on the existence of a sovereign power. Sovereignty is 
defined through its exclusive monopoly over power. Borrows argues that because 
there was and is no legitimate basis for the assertion of colonial sovereignty, there 
was an arbitrary abuse of power which violated the rule of law. But there could be no 
‘rule of law’ without the assertion of a putatively “absolute” or totalising sovereignty.  
Law demands and requires a foundation- a founding act- which is inherently 
violent. While law may alter this ‘originary moment’ in order to be responsive to ever 
changing circumstances and conditions, it will always do so in order to preserve its 
own foundations103 and its power. This foundation in the Canadian context is 
colonization and in legal terms, (colonial) Crown sovereignty. Borrows argues that a 
more peaceful and productive future demands a disruption of existing socio-political 
relations, and the positing of a just foundation. It is not this fact that I take issue with, 
but rather, the impossibility of creating a just foundation through the deployment of 
the rule of law which it tied to the colonial sovereignty that is supposed to be excised. 
 Concepts such as “rule of law”, and “democracy” as they have developed 
within a liberal capitalist order have been predicated on the rights and freedoms of 
some at the expense of others- and this colonial nature of legal concepts has not 
been limited to Aboriginal communities. Borrows’ advocacy of the rule of law as a 
basis upon which to call for the just treatment of Aboriginal peoples can only be done 
if it is abstracted from the context out of which it grew. Notions of freedom that grew 
out of the Ancient philosophical tradition that Borrows invokes are not “philosophical 
absolutes or tangible entities” but take shape in opposition to whatever exists in 
“unfreedom”: 
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Liberal freedom, fitted to an economic order in which property and 
personhood for some entails poverty and deracination for others, is conveyed 
by rights against arbitrary state power on one side and against anarchic civil 
society or property theft on the other. As freedom from encroachment by 
others and from collective institutions, it entails an atomistic ontology, a 
metaphysics of separation, an ethos of defensiveness, and an abstract 
equality. Rendering either the ancient or liberal formations of freedom as 
“concepts”… not only prevents appreciation of their local and historical 
character but preempts perception of what is denied and suppressed by 




There is no tradition to which we can go back, make right, or invoke in a movement 
towards decolonisation.  
 
 
Conclusion    
 
I have attempted, in this review essay, to raise some doubts about the 
political efficacy of a theory of recognition generally, and particularly, as it is 
configured within a politics of difference. I have argued that within the Hegelian 
paradigm of recognition, the only difference that is recognized is that which is proper 
to the totality or entity that is already inscribed as the subject, the community, or the 
nation. On the basis of this argument, I argued that Borrows’ notion of sui generis 
body of law may accomplish the fusing or melding of a plurality of legal orders, but for 
this very reason, cannot be accomplished through a dialectic of recognition as it is 
currently configured within a liberal paradigm of identity/difference. And if it is 
desirable because it successfully “fuses [different] horizons,”105 the preservation of a 
difference based on cultural, ethnic or racialized identities remains problematic 
because it raises the spectre of essence and essentialized identities as the basis for 
inclusion in community. Finally, I have raised a different set of concerns about the 
viability of redeploying foundational concepts such as the ‘rule of law’ in an effort to 
decolonize the Canadian state. 
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 While I have raised several questions, Borrows’ vision of a sui generis legal 
and political order is an attractive proposal for a way to think about the formation of a 
decolonised political community. Placed outside of the paradigm of recognition as it 
has been translated into the language of cultural difference, the idea of 
acknowledging and realizing  (through the material reorganization of control and 
access to resources) a plurality of sovereignties, legal orders, modes of land and 
resource use, and types of relationships between humans, animals and the 
environment could potentially shift social relations in a significant and meaningful 
way.   
 The concept of a sui generis legal order, that is the result of the encounter, 
mutual recognition, and transformation of different legal knowledge(s) holds the 
potential for the ongoing movement or relation- between individuals that constitute 
communities and between ‘communities’ as entities. The question is not how to 
recognize identity/difference, but how to recognize movement,106 the movement and 
continual change that in fact constitute the ongoing formation of the subject and its 
relation to its environs. Sui generis legal knowledge and practice does not have to be 
about achieving a fixed or comprehensible end point- a new body of law that 
represents Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legal orders- but exists in the desire for an 
open ended relation between bodies of knowledge and relations between selves. 
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